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Turkey as a Catalyst for the
Alliance of Civilizations
Umut Uzer
The Alliance of Civilizations (AoC) project off~rs opportunity
spaces for the United Nations as well as for Spain and Turkey to
tackle the issues of radicalism and animosities between different
cultures. This article puts the AoC in its historical and. political
context by analyzing the relevance of Turkish foreign policy and
the ruling Justice and Development Party)s (JDP) orientation to
domestic and foreign affairs. The AoC fits within the framework
of JDP)s inclinations to solve all problems with its neighbors as
well as with its manifest or latent Muslim identity. The major
question is whether Turkey continues to perceive itself as a
Western or Muslim country.
Introduction
olerance has been the overriding motive ofTurkish historical experience starting
rom the time of the Ottoman Empire and continuing during the Republican
rae As a multinational empire) the Ottomans could not have survived through
ppressive measures) necessitating the emergence of tolerance out of cultural as
ell as practical needs of the Turkish people. Besides the humanitarian Islam
f Yunus Emre1 and Mevlana Celalettin Rumi)2 the existence of Christians and
ews in the Empire required a policy of coexistence both at the governmental and
opular levels.
Events that seem to contradict coexistence among different nationalities
nd religions seem to be the exception rather than the rule throughout Turkish
history. Especially after the emergence ofnationalism in the 19th century) liaisons
etween the peoples ofthe empire and the central government deteriorated as the
atter tried to keep the empire intact. Consequently) the breakup ofthe empire was
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traumatic for Turks, Arabs, Greeks, and Armenians. However, peaceful relations
were established between Turkey and Greece in the 1930s upon the efforts of
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Elefterios Venizelos and between Turkey and Syria,
Iraq and the Soviet Union. From that date on peaceful resolution of international
conflicts became the dominant method of Turkish foreign policy behavior.
In this regard, the AoC seems to be commensurate with Turkish and Ottoman
history and the peaceful foreign policy of Republican Turkey. In this article, I will
try to analyze the connection between the Turkish. view towards other ethnic
and religious groups and the AoC initiative. I will start by drawing upon Turkish
history to enlighten the interconnectedness between history and current Turkish
foreign policy, analyze the civilizational debate in early modern Turkey, continue
with a discussion of the clash of civilizations theory of Samuel Huntington, and
conclude with a short narrative ofpolitical endeavors aiming at the establishment
and development of the AoC initiative. "
In sum, I will put the AoC in its historical and political context by.analyzing~
the project's place within the foreign policy of the ruling party in Turkey. It should
also be pointed out that inter-civilizational dialog fits within the framework of an
elevated concern for the former territory of the Ottoman Empire as well as the
Islamic world under the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government.
Turkish History and Tolerance
Turks emerged in world history in Inner Asia, gave their name to the Turkestan,
and eventually moved westward in their long odyssey to the Caucasus, Middle
East, Crimea, Anatolia, and the Balkans. In all these regions, they have engaged
in interactions with different peoples possessing various cultures.
Turkish culture emanated in Inner Asia and as a consequence ofits interaction
with the Chinese, Mongolians, Indians, Iranians, Russians, Georgians, Greeks,
Armenians, and Arabs, modern Turkish culture has influenced and was influenced
by all these different nationalities culminating in a modern tolerant society.
Throughout the centuries, refugees, who were being oppressed and
killed in their countries of origin, found a safe haven among the Turks. For
instance, in 1492 Jews were forced to leave Spain and Portugal and were given a
sanctuary in the Ottoman Turkey. Almost 500 years later, Jewish professors fled
Nazi Germany and served the academic community in Turkey.3 Furthermore,
Turkish diplomats throughout Europe issued Turkish passports, oftentimes to
non-Turkish Jews too, to save them from the Holocaust. Among them Namlk
Kemal Yolga who was working at the Turkish consulate general in Paris and
Necdet Kent in Marseilles and Grenoble in France (Shaw, 1993, pp. 60,64) and
many others should be remembered.
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Earlier in history in 1848, a number ofPolish and Hungarian nationalists were
forced out of their motherlands and found a peaceful land to live in Turkey. To
this day, there is a Polish village in the outskirts of Istanbul, namely Polonezkoy.
One explanation for this state of affairs can be found in Islam as the way it
is practiced and preached in Turkey, which is overwhelmingly peaceful. Both
tate-controlled and popular religion are moderate. The Directorate of Religious
ffairs, Diyanet j~leri Ba~kanltgl, and the Fethullah Gillen movement can be
given as examples to a peaceful path in line with the very message of Islam that is
peaceful, tolerant, and open to dialog.
For instance, Ali Bardakoglu, president ofDiyanet is adamant that not a single
ate speech could be found in the mosques controlled by his organization in
Europe. The DiTiB (Diyanet j~leri Tilrk-jslam Birligi, The Turkish-Islamic Union
of Religious Affairs) mosques in Europe are in close coordination with Diyanet
nd their preachers, imams, are usually appointed by Ankara.
As a culmination of this history, Turkey became a strong supporter of the
oC project. In 2005, Turkey together with Spain, initiated the AoC initiative
under the auspices of the United Nations, which aimed to build bridges and
increase understanding and cooperation between different nationalities,
especially between Muslim and Western societies. Turkey with its centuries of
olerance towards believers of all creeds and the humanitarianism of its Muslim
thinkers, Mevlana Celalettin Rumi and Yunus Emre, has a lot to contribute to an
ever closer understanding between the West and the Muslim world.
It should be remembered that from each religion, extremist individuals do
emerge and the best way to combat them is to emphasize the peaceful elements
inherent in the religion of Islam. The Islam practiced in Turkey and the Turkic
world is commensurate with democracy, human rights, tolerance, and co-
existence. After all, we should be aware that there will always be different
religions and points of view, and the logical policy would be to live peacefully
ide by side. ~~
It would be in order to emphasize the similarities between Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam, rather than quibble about their differences, and remember
that there is a common Abrahamic legacy and tradition embraced by all the
followers of the three monotheistic religions. A proper interpretation of Islam
would make it evident that Islam respects all the previous prophets of God which
to a large extent correspond to Adam, Noah, Moses, and Jesus as well as other
religious figures of Judaism and Christianity and the books of God by which the
Old Testament and the New Testament are implied. It all depends on interpreting
religion in a peaceful manner and trying to break the monopoly of the extremists
over Islamist discourse.
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Turkish Identity and a Civilizational Approach
Turkish perception of culture and civilization are pertinent to the discussion
at hand. During and after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, there were
arguments about Turkish identity and its place in Europe as opposed to the Muslim
world. Among the first articulators of Turkish nationalism, Ziya Gokalp (1876-
1924) discussed the concept of civilization in detail and called for a civilizational
change for Turks without losing their national traits.
Ziya Gokalp made a differentiation between culture (hars) and civilization
(medeniyet), the former being national whereas the latter international,
corresponding more or less to technology. The founder of modern Turkey,
Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, on the other hand advocated a single universal
civilization, which he called contemporary civilization (muaslr medeniyet) to
which Turkey should belong.
In contrast, Ziya Gokalp in his book, History of the Turkish Civilization,
published in 1925 wrote that there could be no single civilization, rather there were
numerous civilizations in the world. He used the term medeniyet as a translation of
the French word la civilisation (Gokalp, 1976, p. 17). He talked about the Egyptian
civilizational circle, the Mediterranean civilization constructed to a large extent
.by Phoenicians, Christian civilization in Europe, and an Islamic civilization in
Asia and North Africa. In Europe, after the Renaissance and Reformation, the
Christian civilization was transformed into a secular civilization. Turks have
already changed their civilizational identity twice throughout their history.
Initially, they belonged to the Far East civilization living in the borderlands of
China and around present day Mongolia. After their conversion to Islam, Turks
entered the Eastern civilization. Since the 19th century, Turks were trying to
become part of the Western civilization (G6kalp, 1976, p. 18).
A civilization is an international construct, developed through method
and mind and is the collection of economic, religious, legal, and moral ideas.
Culture, on the other hand, is national, cultivated through intuition and is the
sum total of religious, moral, and aesthetic emotions. In Gokalp' s judgment,
nations can change their civilization but not their culture (Gokalp, 1976, p.
19, my emphases). In other words, a civilization was the sum total of positive
sciences and technology whereas culture was a product of religion, morality,
language, and aesthetic values (Gokalp, 1959, pp. 133-134, 246). For our
purposes a more relevant idea from Ziya Gokalp was that he explicitly rejected
equating religion with civilization. For example, there were Eastern and
Western civilizations and they borrowed from each other without any feelings
of inferiority. Arabs borrowed from the Byzantine music and philosophy, and
Armenians and Jews shared the Oriental taste in music (Gokalp, 1959, pp. 272-
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73), they in fact contributed to the classical Ottoman palace music, which was
in fact influenced by Byzantium as well.
For Ziya Gokalp, this dichotomy was important because a nation had to
protect its culture and values without being out of touch with modern times.
He was proposing a synthesis between Turkish, Muslim, and Western elements
o form a modern Turkish nationalism under the inspiration of science and
echnology (Gokalp, 1988, p. 34). While there was no universal civilization, there
ould be a society of nations in the future (Gokalp, 1959, pp. 280-282).
Among the conservative thinkers, Peyami Safa also called for a harmonious
ynthesis between the Eastern and Western civilizations together with national-
religious traditions. He was proposing the injection of the spiritual values of the
East into the West and in return importing the scientific methods and technology
rom the West. While Europeanizing, progress towards a new amalgamation
of the intuition of the East should also be achieved. Neither the Arabs nor the
Europeans should be imitated in his judgment, as Turks were prone to copy
rabic culture and language in the past and European ways and mannerism at
the present (Safa, 1976, p. 23-26). This was a conservative criticism of Kemalist
reforms, which, in his and other conservatives' minds, have gone too far in aping
the European culture.
Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, on the other hand, advocated modernization and
expressed his opinion that there was only a single contemporary civilization. He
as critical of the limitations of Islamic teaching and thought and believed that a
break with the Islamic past was necessary.
It would not be fair to say that Ziya Gokalp was opposed to Kemalist
reforms as he died in 1924 before they were fully in place. While there was a
different approach to civilization on the part of Gokalp and Atatiirk, there were
also numerous similarities between their ideas. In fact, the founder of modern
Turkey called Gokalp the father of his ideas. Furthermore, Turkish call to prayer,
modernization, and secularization ofsocial and political life, gender equality, and
of course, cultural nationalism were all beliefs which they enthusiastically shared.
They were also believers in the necessity ofthe Western orientation ofthe Turkish
people so that they would achieve political, economic, and cultural progress.
The Clash of Civilizations
We need to remember the context of the AoC as to why it emerged. In fact it
appeared as a reaction to the clash of civilizations theory articulated first by
Bernard Lewis (1990, p. 60) and then by Samuel Huntington.
When analyzing historical or political phenomena, it is absolutely in order to
take civilizations as units of analysis. For instance, the eminent historian Arnold
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Toynbee in interpreting human history, took encounters between civilizations into
consideration. Analyzing the Ottoman-European relations from this perspective,
Toynbee discussed the European onslaught on the Islamic World, after the Turkish
failure in the second siege of Vienna in 1683 (Toynbee, 1953, p. 2).
The relations between the Western world and the Muslim world have been
based on inequality, the former encroaching upon Muslim lands ever since
Napoleon set foot in Egypt in 1798. Unless there is a move towards equilibrium
between the two entities, it would be very difficult to establish healthy relations
based on recognition and dignity. Today, there is both collaboration and conflict
between the West and the Islamic World. The most important issue for the
majority of Muslims is a just resolution of the Palestinian problem (Uzer, 2004,
p. 141). From this point of view, we can definitely claim that efforts by the new
American administration to resolve this dispute would not only serve peace in
the Middle East and the world but also American national interests.
The clash of civilizations thesis was popularized by Harvard political scientist
Samuel Huntington in an article, "Clash of Civilizations?" published in the
summer 1993 edition of the Foreign Affairs journal. The author expected the new
area of conflict to be cultural rather than ideological or economic and that states
would coalesce around other states possessing similar civilizational identities. He
defined civilizations as cultural units, in fact the highest forms of cultures just
below humanity. Categorizing the Islamic civilization, he discussed its Turkish,
Arab, and Malaysian sub-units (Huntington, 1996, pp. 1-3).
Huntington identified eight civilizations including Western, Confucian,
Japanese, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, African, and Islamic
civilizations. He predicted that in the post-Cold War era, there would be clashes
between those civilizations, especially since peoples belonging to different
civilizations became more conscious of their identities as opposed to other
civilizations as a consequence of globalization. The West's power and wealth has
become a source of animosity among members of different civilizations. The
bottom line about the civilizations is that nations cannot change their civilizational
identities (Huntington, 1996, pp.4-5), hence foreign policy behavior of states
would be influenced by such civilizational concerns.
He expanded his article into abook, The Clash ofCivilizations and theRemaking
of World Order, in which he argued there already emerged a multicivilizational
and multipolar world. He insisted that civilizational identities, determined by
religion, influenced foreign policies of the states and consequently for world
peace, each civilization should be represented at the UN Security Council as a
permanent member. Turkey should take the helm as the leader of the Muslim
world instead ofbeing humiliated at the gates ofEurope. The rest ofthe arguments
are similar to the article except he added a ninth civilization, namely the Buddhist
Uzer 137
ivilization which included Tibet, Mongolia, and Cambodia (Huntington, 2003,
. 20, 48, 178-179, 308, 312, 317).
In his article, Huntington characterized Turkey as a torn country because it
as facing an identity crisis about which civilization it belonged. It has rejected
e Islamic civilization and has been rejected by Europe. This state of affairs led to
turn toward the Turkic world, of which it desired to be its leader.(Huntington,
996, pp. 7, 13-14). It should be emphasized that Turkish interest in the Turkic
orld was never presented by Turkish decision makers or commentators as an
ternative to Europe.
For a civilizational change to materialize, the elites as well as the public
ould be convinced of this change but more importantly members of the target
o ilization should believe in the necessity for such a civilizational change and
cept the country in question as a new member (Huntington, 1996, p. 21).
As far as Turkey is concerned, especially the third element is lacking as the
uropean public opinion has not embraced Turkey as part of the European
ltural sphere. Furthermore, it is also unclear whether the bulk of the Turkish
eople consider themselves as European. There is always a differentiation when
urks talk about ((the Europeans" and their efforts seem to be more trying to be
uropean than being and feeling truly European.
Also, Huntington was adamant that a civilizational war should be prevented
t all cost and all civilizations should learn to live peacefully and in coexistence.
e ruled out the possibility of a universal civilization and was arguing for the
onsolidation of the Western civilization (Huntington, 1996, pp. 24-2~) While he
rgued for peace between civilizations, he also advocated a civilizational split such
hat they should live separately without distorting each others' cultural essence.
y definition of civilization is somewhat different from the one devised
Samuel Huntington. I purport to make a more comprehensive analysis
f civilization that goes beyond religion-of course also incorporating
°t into my definition-encompassing all cultural, philosophical, and
rtistic artifacts in addition to political institutions. In other words) I
o not equate civilization with religion which also has secular elements
.ncluding art, music) and archaeology.
Furthermore, a civilization is never a closed unit. There is neither a monolithic
estern civilization nor an Islamic civilization. There is no reason why people
hould not engage in cross-cultural encounters and try to amalgamate what they
erceive to be the positive or desirable elements, from another civilization. In fact,
hat is what globalization is about. And Ziya Gokalp might be right in the sense
hat without losing one's national culture, an individual can adopt civilizational
ttributes of another unit.
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One of the major problems with Huntington's theory is that identities are
presented as static formations without much possibility to change. While
identities are significant and his theory has explanatory power in cases such as al-
Qaeda's attack on mainland United States, it does not change the fact that states
override cultural affiliations for the sake of national (read state) interests. The
rise and fall of pan-Arabism is a case in point. And it should also be pointed out
that intra-civilizational conflicts can be as severe as inter-civilizational conflicts
as seen in the Iran-Iraq war. There is as much cooperation as conflict between
nations belonging to different civilizations. Turkey's close cooperation with the
Western world and its improved relations with Middle Eastern nations can be
argued as a case in point.
Turkish people have a grounding in both the Islamic and the Western worlds
and their inclusion or exclusion in the European Union can be a function of
its civilizational identity as well as pure political calculation on the part of the
European politicians. Considered as the Other for many centuries, it would not
be easy for the European public to embrace the Turks as fellow Europeans. It
should be mentioned that the Turkish expatriate community living in Western
Europe, especially in Germany, has not demonstrated to be a good example of
integration due to both their intransigence as well as the discriminatory attitudes
of the authorities and peoples in the countries in which they reside. It remains to
be seen whether they will be successful in their long odyssey from Inner Asia to
Eastern Europe to become accepted members of Europe. This depends as much
on the endeavors of the Turks as on the willingness of the European nations. Only
then will the validity of Huntington's ideas about Turkey be vindicated or not.
The AoC and Turkey
The leaders of the Justice and Development Party, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and
Abdullah Gul, since their election in 2002 and reelection in 2007 advocated a
proactive foreign policy for Turkey in its region and the world. The person behind
these ideas was Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, the foreign policy adviser to prime
minister Erdogan and the current foreign minister, who championed making
good use of Turkish history and its imperial legacy for a dynamic foreign policy
in his book, Strategic Depth (Davutoglu, 2003). He was ofthe opinion that Turkey
should become a central country in its region and follow a «multidimensional
foreign policy» (Duran, 2006, p. 292). Besides Davutoglu, another academic-
politician Mehmet AydIn, minister ofstate, was also influential in the articulation
of Turkey's policy (Balci & Mi~, 2008, p. 388).
The party had a number of achievements in its foreign policy among which
election of Professor Ekmelettin ihsanoglu as the secretary general of the
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rganization of Islamic Conference (OIC)) the start of accession talks with the
uropean Union and Turkey)s election to the UN Security Council as a non-
rmanent member in 2008 can be mentioned.
The new party adopted a radical change from the Islamist National Outlook
ovement (Milli Goru~ Hareketi) which included parties- namely MNP) MSP) RP)
P and Sp4) ofwhich it was an offshoot and jettisoned the anti-Western and anti-
mitic discourse and world-view in favor of a pragmatic party of services and a
Hcy of pro-European Union decisions and measures (Yavuz) 2006) p. 3).
While the JDP was in favor of «civilizational dialog)) between the Muslim and
estern peoples) it did not shy away from criticizing the problems in the Islamic
rId as well) as can be observed in the statement offoreign minister Abdullah Gill
the Organization of Islamic conference summit in Tehran in 2003) to the effect
at the Muslim World was in dire need of democratization) promotion of human
. hts) and protection of the status ofwomen (Duran) 2006) pp. 288-289).
Even though the first EU-OIC summit meeting was held under the tenure of
e late foreign minister Ismail Cern from the emocratic Left Party in February
02) the JDP continued these summits and perceived them as commensurate
ith their promotion of dialog between cultures and civilizations. To prove his
fo-European orientation) Erdogan)s first visit after becoming prime minister
s to Greece and Western European capitals (Duran) 2006) p. 287).
The pro-EU policies of the JDP government had a number of functions.
moving away from the Islamist discourse of their past they opened up new
aces to play the political game domestically and internationally. In other
rds) they tried to shield themselves from the criticism of the secular circles
luding the bureaucracy and military that they were an anti-secular movement
making domestic reforms needed for EU accession. Furthermore) they made
e facto alliance with the liberal intellectuals in the press and at the academe
t supported the government's policies of democratization and the softening
emalism.
At the international level, Erdogan and Gill succeeded in convincing many
rters at European capitals and to some extent in Washington that the party
the wave of the future and they were on the path of Europeanization and
mocratization of Turkey.
This was especially the case in JDP)s Cyprus policy on which they were
lined to follow the EU position and tried to resolve the conflict between Turks
Greeks on the two mainlands and in the island (Duran) 2006) p. 291). Thus
of the iconography of the nationalists right and left and even the National
tlook Movement was shattered by the new pragmatic political party.
The intellectual background for the Aoe project was presented in the previous
ussion of the clash of civilizations to which it was a reaction. Huntington)s
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theory was perceived by many as advocating war and conflict and a remedy was
searched by intellectuals and politicians.
The Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had already internalized
civilizational dialog as can be observed from his speech at the American Enterprise
Institute, in Washington D.C., on January 29, 2004. He talked about the «harmony
of civilizations)) and «meeting of civilizations)) and his desire to struggle against
the prospects of clash of civilizations. He opined that all monotheistic religions
preached against violence and terrorism and that killing of a single individual
was equivalent to killing the whole mankind (Erdogan, 2006, pp. 337, 339-340).
In other words, Erdogan was expressing ideas similar to the AoC, before it was
undertaken as an initiative of Spain.
The first proposal for conciliation between civilizations came on November 4,
1998, from the Iranian President Mohammed Khatami. The United Nations later
adopted this idea and declared 2001 as the year of Dialogue among Civilizations
(Balc! & Mi~, 2008, p. 390).
Meanwhile, on March 14, 2004, three days after the train bombings in Madrid
killing. 191 people, Luis Zapatero was elected as the Spanish prime minister. He
defeated Jose Maria Aznar, who had supported the American occupation of Iraq.
The significance ofthis election was that Zapatero was advocating the ithdrawal
of all Spanish troops from Iraq (Balc! & Mi~, 2008, p. 391).
Consequently, the new Spanish prime minister proposed the « between
the Western and the Arab and Muslim world)) to the U e'-''P"r>o'Y-'''P"'''T General
during a speech he made at the UN General Assembly on e 1, 2004.
He invited Turkey to become a co-sponsor of the AoC ini . act Kofi
Annan, was adamant that a Muslim country should be one onsors of
the initiative (Balc! & Mi~, 2008, p. 392).
On July 14, 2005, Spain and Turkey established the nder the
auspices of the United Nations. Its aims included: bein ilder and
convener, connecting people and organizations devote trust and
understanding between diverse communities, partic clusively
- between Muslim and Western societies;' «catalyst an ing to give
impetus to innovative projects aimed at reducing polarl·2~tlonbe1[\\rl~,en nations and
cultures;' and being an «advocate for building resp ing among
cultures and amplifying voices ofmoderation and r . h help calm
cultural and religious tensions)) (http:// / ·ew/39/73/
lang,english/ accessed on January 27,2009 On ary General
Ban Ki-Moon appointed the former president 0 paio, as the
High Representative for the AoC whose Secre i hed in New
York City (http://www.unaoc.org/content/vie / accessed on
January 27, 2009).
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The AoC claims to have a global perspective, not confined to eradicating the
misunderstandings and stereotypes between the Western and Muslim worlds,
rather focusing on all forms ofdiscrimination, including against the minorities.
They employ the term civilization or culture in the broadest sense of the word,
and do not equate civilization with religion. Hence, the AoC does not pursue
interfaith or interreligious dialog but endorses exchanges between people
of divergent cultures (Interview with Emmanuel Kattan, Communications
Adviser, Office of the Secretariat, Alliance ofCivilizations, New York City, April
22,2009).
Previously, the High-Level Group for the AoC was nominated by Kofi Annan
which consisted of20 politicians and intellectuals. The co-chairs ofthe High Level
Group were Professor Federico Mayor of Spain and Professor Mehmet AydIn of
Turkey. Other members included Mohammed Khatami of Iran, Ismail Serageldin
of Egypt, Mohamed Charfi of Tunisia, Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South
Africa, Hubert Vedrine of France, Karen Armstrong of the United Kingdom,
Vitaly Naumkin from Russia, John Esposito and Rabbi Arthur Schneier from the
United States.
Admittedly, this is a remarkable and prestigious group of people, including
the former French foreign minister, an unyielding fighter against apartheid and
experts on world religions. All these individuals have worked across different
cultures bystudyingvarious religions and languages. John Esposito ofGeorgetown
University, as well as Vitaly Naumkin of Moscow State University and Mehmet
AydIn are experts on Islam. Rabbi Arthur Schneier has been an advocate of inter-
religious cooperation and visited numerous countries to this end.
The High Level Group prepared a report for the meeting in Istanbul on
November 11-13, 2006, which stated that the "divide between Muslim and
Western societies are not religious, but political" and that the "central driver in
global tensions" was the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Baici & Mi~, 2008, p. 399).
There is also an 80-member Group of Friends of AoC, including numerous
countries and international organizations such as the Arab League, European
Commission, Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Visibly absent are the United States and Israel.
The Turkish prime minister fully embraced the initiative which would, in
his judgment "end terrorism" throughout the world. He also wrote an article
for the International Herald Tribune together with his Spanish counterpart,
Zapatero, demanding ((respect and calm" from all the parties to the conflict,
revolving around the publication of a number of cartoons illustrating prophet
Muhammad as a terrorist in the Danish and then Norwegian newspapers (Balcl
& Mi~, p. 394-395). The Minister of State Mehmet AydIn was a bit more critical of
Europeans as he said that even though Muslims loved Jesus, Westerners did not
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love Muhammad. He also pointed out that Islamophobia should be resisted just
like anti-Semitism is combated against (Balcl & Mi~, pp. 396, 398).
The initiative was used by Turkey as a tool furthering its membership in
the European Union and utilizing to increase its prestige. Tayyip Erdogan had
said time and again that the European Union could only prove that it was not a
Christian club by allowing Turkey to become a member, which would function
as a bridge between Europe and the Islamic world. For Spain, on the other hand,
AoC enabled it to hasten its withdrawal from Iraq and to fight against terrorism.
Balci and Mi~ argued that the project can be seen as the «Middle Easternization
of its foreign policy" and portrayal of Turkey as the «spokesperson of the Islamic
world': They are also quick to add that many retired politicians were represented
on the High Level Group, for instance Muhammed Charfi, former Education
minister of Tunisia, former Iranian president Mohammed Khatami, Moustapha
Niasse, former prime minister of Senegal, and Ali Atalas, former foreign minister
of Indonesia. They also pointed out that there was little emphasis on Judaism,
Buddhism, and Confucianism (Balcl & Mi~, pp. 389, 400-402) within the
mechanisms of AoC. This is implied as a weakness of the initiative where retired
politicians participate but probably nothing substantial would emerge.
In a sense, the kinds of arguments mentioned above by the Turkish prime
minister, reverses Turkey's desire to become a European state, rather presents
Turkey as a member of the Islamic world in, what was until now, a Christian club.
The argument contains the implicit assumption that by admitting a Muslim country,
the European Union proves that it is not antagonistic to the Islamic world.
Such an argument, however, begs the question as to whether Turkey is a
typical Muslim country, if there is such a phenomenon, and more importantly,
whether Turkey's secularism, democracy, pro-Western foreign policy, and
partially geography were not the characteristics that enabled its candidacy to
the European Union in the first place. Regardless of these questions, the AoC
continued its deliberations.
The AoC further cultivated its projects at the Second Forum of the UN
Alliance of Civilizations, held in Istanbul on April 6-7, 2009. Ever since the
inaugural Forum of Madrid in January 2008, the AoC strived to encourage
specific projects and initiatives that would promote intercultural dialogue among
grassroots advocates with politicians and religious leaders (Alliance's Initiatives
and Ongoing Programs: General Overview. Second Forum of the UN Alliance
of Civilizations. Istanbul, Turkey, 6-7 April, 2009,). In other words, the AoC
secretariat wanted to turn a good idea into concrete, down-to earth projects that
influenced people on the ground, especially the youth.
Among the projects and initiatives, which aim at collaboration between
civil society, the business world and the government, one ,could mention the
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youth event, with the goal to build «a Global Youth Movement" to foster dialog
among the youngsters living in various countries. The Alliance Fellowship entails
learning about each other's culture, politics, and media by visiting other countries.
Silatech is another initiative that will create jobs, and will provide capital for
entrepreneurs in the Arab world (Outcomes of the Second Forum of the Alliance
of Civilizations, 2009).
The Dialogue Cafe, supported by Cisco, through video-conferencing in pilot
cafes in New York, London, Istanbul, and in a number of cities in the Middle East
will enable citizens of various countries to engage in dialog with other people
living in different cities of the world. On the other hand, Alliance Research
Network will function as a think-tank focusing on education, media, migration,
and youth, and promoting educational exchanges. A number of experts from 12
universities will cooperate and debate issues of interest to them and to the AoC
(Outcomes of the Second Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations, 2009).
The Alliance Foru:m aims to promote «intercultural cooperation" and
realize a «dialogue that delivers:' It also calls itself as a «global matchmaker"
connecting "innovative grassroots initiatives with policy makers and potential
funders" (Istanbul Forum: Concrete Progress made in building Bridges,
Connecting People across borders). Furthermore, there are numerous
publications, documentaries, and media outlets, encouraging especially the
youth from all around the world to be in touch with each other and learn the
culture of different peoples. One ambitious initiative is the Pakistan Madrasa
Project aspiring to reform the curricula at the seminaries in the country in
question and training the teachers at those schools (Outcomes of the Second
Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations, 2009).
Evidently, Turkey has a lot to contribute to the AoC through its civil society
organizations, universities, think tanks, and media. There are abundance of
ideas and ideologies that are competing with each other and there is an active
civil society including secular and religious associations. As a country with a
moderate and peaceful understanding of religion, it can offer the possibilities of
being Western, Muslim, and democratic at the same time.
Of course, it is unclear as to whether different civilizations are perceived by
the UN, Spain, and Turkey as separate but equal entities, each deserving respect
and recognition. In other words, Turkey's desire to become part of Europe might
flounder if there is such a perception.
This is particularly relevant as there are strong opposition voices against
Turkey's accession to the European Union. Both German Prime Minister Angela
Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy offered Turkey a privileged
partnership instead of full membership in the European Union. Angela Merkel
not only called Turkey culturally different but also as not having lived through










the European Enlightenment. Furthermore, overwhelming majorities in Austria,
France, and Germany are opposed to Turkey's accession to the European Union
(Yavuz, 2009, pp. 219-220, 227).
A more positive approach is being heard, as far as reconciliation between
religions is concerned, from the United States. President Barack Obama in
his inaugural speech in January 2009 said the United States was a country of
Jews, Christians, Muslims, Hindus, and nonbelievers. He also opened up to the
Muslim World in his speech at Cairo University on June 4, 2009. In that speech,
Obama tried to send a message to the Muslim world by saying that faith should
bring people together not divide them. He also praised "Turkey's leadership in
the Alliance of Civilizations" (http://www.unaoc.org/content/view/369/73/lang
english/, accessed on June 26, 2009).
The UN High Representative for the AoC Jorge Sampaio welcomed the bold
vision set forth by the American President to "inaugurate a new era of peace
and cooperation between the 'Muslim world' and the West based on mutual
respect, trust and partnership. From the Alliance of Civilizations' perspective,
this approach provides a strong framework, not only for advancing uslim-
Western relations, but also for engagement between diverse communities and
cultures around the world. It constitutes our best hope to turn tide 0 mistrust
that have beset us in past decades and forge a new beginning" (http:// .unaoc.
org/content/view/369/73/lang,english/, accessed on June 26, 2009 .
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with the Muslim world, a path that doesn't attempt to paste
builds on common aspirations. Most importantly, he empn:aStzes
address the various sources of tensions-including viole
conflict between Israelis and Palestinians-and join r
Moreover, President Obama recognized the realization
and development opportunities for all as a main g I
concrete actions" (http://www.unaoc.org/conten / .
accessed on June 26, 2009).
From the statements above, a closer relation
and the UN AoC can be expected under the 0 a
Conclusion: Prospects for and wea:KJles,ses
Today, the United States has a president wh
While, Barack Obama is a Christian, hi
Kansan, and having lived in Indonesia t
the world, could help him establish po i .
well as with sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, a
Hussein..




Of course it should be added that having such a background is not a sine
qua non for a successful foreign policy. Bill Clinton had none of these family
connections but he was successful in establishing or continuing positive relations
with Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and other Muslim nations. Most Turks remember
him when he visited Turkey in the aftermath of the horrible earthquake in 1999,
playing with a baby who recently survived the horrendous calamity. His speeches
at the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the Jordanian parliament are also
reminisced }\There he said he was respectful of Islam convincing many Muslims.
So, Obama comes to the presidency at a historic time, when relations between
Americans and the Muslims need mending. His emphasis on dialog both at home
and throughout the world are causes for hope for the resolution of disputes such
as the Arab-Israeli conflict through diplomacy and negotiations.
To the post-September 11 world, Turkey can offer a model ofmoderation and
peaceful co-existence. The Armenian village of Vaklfll in the province of Hatay
as well as the Polish village in the outskirts of Istanbul can be given as symbols of
co-existence between different nationalities in modern Turkey.
Admittedly, Turkish history is not flawless regarding tolerance and
coexistence. The 1934 Thrace incidents against the Jews, the 1942 Wealth Tax
imposed predominantly on non-Muslims, and the September 6-7, 1955 attacks
on Greeks are examples when foreign relations or other security considerations
can be used to justify putting pressure on domestic minorities. Such occurrences
however, are not supported by the majority ofthe people and are always criticized
in newspaper columns to this very day.
It should also be borne in mind that there is proliferation of intolerance
among certain circles in Turkey existing both among religious and secular circles.
There is a serious polarization in modern Turkey between the supporters of the
government and the opposition. Attacks on priests and missionaries, while not
widespread, are still worrisome. Those concerned about missionary activities in
Turkey.seem to be unaware about the existence of numerous Turkish mosques
in Europe and North America. What we are seeing is the radicalization ofyouth
as a reaction to a number of conspiracy theories which have been proliferating
and increasing their influence after 2002-2003. The reasons for this state of affairs
are manifold but two major reasons can be given. The first one is the American
occupation of Iraq in 2003 and the perception that Americans are supporting
the creation of a Kurdish state. The second one is the JDP, perceived by many
secularists as a party with a secret agenda to Islamize Turkey.
This state of affairs is a major concern for peaceful coexistence among people
belonging to different ideologies and religions. All political and social groups in
Turkey should emphaSize the significance of democracy and respect for freedom
of expression and opinion.
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What is striking about the AoC is that Spain with its Islamic past- albeit not
always peaceful and Turkey with a number ofproblems in its recent history, have
come together to transcend religious bigotry and to establish a more peaceful
world. While, this initiative should be commended, it should be given form and
substantiated so that the precise mechanisms and aims of the initiative becomes
manifest. For this aim to materialize American and Israeli participation are
essential as these are the two controversial countries for the Middle East.
The AoC is a good idea which is hard to translate into practical politics
and achieve concrete results. That is why the AoC started numerous projects
and initiatives. As a concept, the AoC is contemplating closer liaisons between
cultures and civilizations, yet it is not necessarily an alliance, a mechanism,which
has to be against a state or organization. While the AoC is against terrorism, it
does not form a classical alliance against terrorist organizations either. Rather, it
is a mechanism, a marketplace of ideas, where one can exchange and learn about
each other's experiences and culture.
Institutionally, there is a risk that it might become another bureaucratic
agency under the United Nations. These weaknesses however, do not cancel out
the good intentions behind this project aiming at minimizing animosities and
misunderstandings and trying to establish respectful relations between civilizations.
It is a challenge to be addressed not only among but also within nations.
The discourse and practice of tolerance should be empha ized against the
preachers of extremism. On this point, Mevlana is a highl rele ant historical
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